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Motivation
▶ R&D partnerships have become a widespread phenomenon
characterizing technological dynamics, especially in industries
with rapid technological development.1
▶ Firms have become more specialized on specific domains of a
technology and they tend to combine their knowledge with the
knowledge of other firms that are specialized in different
technological domains.2
▶ Despite the importance of R&D collaborations for technological
change and economic growth, there is no comprehensive study of
R&D policy (network design, subsidies) in such networked
markets.
1John Hagedoorn. “Inter-firm R&D partnerships: an overview of major trends and
patterns since 1960”. Research Policy 31.4 (2002), pp. 477–492.
2Martin L. Weitzman. “Recombinant Growth”. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113.2 (1998), pp. 331–360.
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Contribution
▶ We study a structural model of R&D alliance networks where
firms jointly form R&D collaborations to lower their production
costs while competing on the product market.
▶ We provide a complete Nash equilibrium characterization, derive
an efficiency analysis and determine the optimal R&D subsidy
program that maximizes welfare.
▶ We then structurally estimate our model using a unique panel of
R&D collaborations and annual company reports.
▶ We use our estimates to analyze the impact of R&D subsidy
programs, and study how temporal changes in the network affect
the optimal R&D policy.
3/30
The Model
▶ Firms can reduce their costs for production by investing into
R&D as well as by establishing an R&D collaboration with
another firm.
▶ The amount of this cost reduction depends on the effort ei that a
firm i and the effort ej that its R&D collaboration partners
j ∈ Ni invest into the collaboration.
▶ Given the effort level ei ∈ R+, marginal cost ci of firm i is given
by




where aij = 1 if firms i and j set up a collaboration (0 otherwise)
and aii = 0.
▶ The inverse demand function for firm i is






▶ We assume that R&D effort is costly. In particular, the cost of
R&D effort is an increasing function and given by Z = 12e2i .3 Firm
i’s profit πi is then given by





▶ Inserting marginal cost from Equation (1) and inverse demand
from Equation (2) into Equation (3) gives
πi = (ᾱi − c̄i)qi − q2i − ρ
n∑
j=1









where bij ∈ {0, 1} is the ij-th element of the matrix B indicating
whether firms i and j operate in the same market.
3C. D’Aspremont and A. Jacquemin. “Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in
duopoly with spillovers”. The American Economic Review 78.5 (1988), pp. 1133–1137.
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Equilibrium Characterization
▶ From the FOC with respect to R&D effort, ∂πi∂ei = qi − ei = 0, we
find that ei = qi.4
▶ From the FOC with respect to output, ∂πi∂qi = 0, we obtain










j=1 bijqj is the product rivalry effect,
▶ φ
∑n
j=1 aijqj is technology (or knowledge) spillover effect,
▶ µi ≡ ᾱi − c̄i is the ex ante heterogeneity in terms of firms
(ᾱi) and markets (c̄i).
4W.M. Cohen and S. Klepper. “A reprise of size and R&D”. The Economic Journal
106.437 (1996), pp. 925–951.
6/30
▶ Let λPF(A) be the largest eigenvalue of A and denote by












{(|Mm| − 1)} < 1 − φλPF(A), (7)
hold, then there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium with
output levels given by
q = (In + ρB − φA)−1µ. (8)
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▶ Assume that there is only a single market and let ϕ ≡ φ1−ρ . Then
there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium with output levels
given by
q = 11 − ρ
(
bµ (G, ϕ)−
ρ∥bµ (G, ϕ) ∥1




where bµ(G, ϕ) is the µ-weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality5
defined by




▶ The coefficient a[k]ij in the (i, j) element of Ak counts the number
of walks of length k in G between i and j.
5Phillip Bonacich. “Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures”. American
Journal of Sociology 92.5 (1987), pp. 1170–1182.
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Example
▶ Consider an industry composed of 3 firms and 2 sectors, M1 and
M2, where firm 1 and 2, as well as firm 1 and firm 3 have an
R&D collaboration, and firm 1 and 2 operate in the same market
M1.
▶ Then the adjacency matrix A and
the competition matrix B are
given by
A =




 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 0




















▶ Firm 1 enjoys higher profits due to having the largest number of
R&D collaborations when competition is weak (small ρ), but its
profits are falling with increasing ρ, becoming smaller than the
profits of firm 3 if ρ > φ.
▶ This result highlights the key trade off faced by firms between
the technology spillover effect and the product rivalry effect (cf.
Bloom et al. 2013).
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The R&D Subsidy Program
▶ An active government is introduced that can provide a
(potentially firm specific) subsidy, si ≥ 0, per unit of R&D.
▶ The profit of firm i can then be written as (cf. e.g. Hinloopen,
2001, 2003; Spencer, 1983)6










i + siei. (10)
▶ If we define net welfare as W(G, s) ≡ W(G, s)−
∑n
i=1 eisi, then
the social planner’s problem is given by
s∗ = argmaxs∈Rn+W(G, s).
6J. Hinloopen. “Subsidizing R&D Cooperatives”. De Economist 149.3 (2001),
pp. 313–345; Barbara J. Spencer and James A. Brander. “International R & D Rivalry
and Industrial Strategy”. The Review of Economic Studies 50.4 (1983), pp. 707–722.
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Optimal Subsidies
▶ The government (or the planner) is here introduced as an agent
that can set subsidy rates on R&D effort (first stage) in a period
before the firms spend on R&D (second stage).
▶ The unique interior Nash equilibrium with targeted subsidies (in
the second stage) is given by q = q̃ + Rs, where
R = M (In + φA), q̃ = Mµ, equilibrium efforts are given by
ei = qi + si and profits are given by πi = (q2i + s2i )/2.












)−1 (2R⊤ (In + ρ2B)− In) q̃.
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Empirical Implications – Data
▶ For the purpose of estimating our model we use the combined
Thomson SDC and MERIT-CATI databases.7
▶ This database contains information about strategic technology
agreements, including any alliance that involves some
arrangements for mutual transfer of technology or joint research,
such as joint research pacts, joint development agreements, cross
licensing, R&D contracts, joint ventures and research
corporations.
▶ We use annual data about balance sheets and income statements
from Standard & Poor’s Compustat U.S. fundamentals database,
and Burea Van Dijk’s Osiris database.
7M.A. Schilling. “Understanding the alliance data”. Strategic Management Journal
30.3 (2009), pp. 233–260. issn: 1097-0266.
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Figure: The largest connected component of the R&D collaboration network with
all links accumulated until the year 2005.
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Empirical Implications - Estimation
▶ Our empirical counterpart of the marginal cost cit of firm i from
Equation (1) at period t has a fixed cost equal to
c̄it = η∗i − ϵit − xitβ, so that




▶ xit is a measure for the productivity of firm i,
▶ η∗i captures the unobserved (to the econometrician)
time-invariant characteristics of the firms, and
▶ εit (i.i.d.) captures the remaining unobserved (to the
econometrician) characteristics of the firms.
▶ Denote by κt ≡ ᾱt and ηi ≡ ᾱm − η∗i , where κt captures a time
fixed effect due to exogenous demand shifters while ηi, which
includes both ᾱm and η∗i , captures a firm fixed effect.
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bijqjt + βxit + ηi + κt + ϵit, (12)
with an i.i.d. error term ϵit.
▶ Output qit is calculated using sales divided by
country-year-industry price deflators from the OECD-STAN
database.
▶ The exogenous variable xit is the firm’s time-lagged R&D stock
using a perpetual inventory method with a 15% depreciation
rate,8 with R&D tax credits as instruments.
▶ Equation (12) corresponds to a high-order Spatial Auto-Regressive
(SAR) model with two spatial lags Atqt and Bqt.9
8Bronwyn H Hall, Adam B Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. “Market value and patent
citations: A first look”. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.
w7741 (2000).
9L. Lee and X. Liu. “Efficient GMM estimation of high order spatial autoregressive
models with autoregressive disturbances”. Econometric Theory 26.1 (2010),
pp. 187–230.
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▶ Output qit is calculated using sales divided by
country-year-industry price deflators from the OECD-STAN
database.10
▶ The network data stems from the combined CATI-SDC
databases and we set aij,t = 1 if there exists an R&D
collaboration between firms i and j in the last s years before time
t, where s is the duration of an alliance.
▶ The exogenous variable xit is the firm’s time-lagged R&D stock
at the time t − 1.
▶ Finally, we measure bij as in the theoretical model so that bij = 1
if firms i and j are the same industry (measured by the industry
SIC codes at the 4-digit level) and zero otherwise.
10Peter N. Gal. “Measuring total factor productivity at the firm level using
OECD-ORBIS”. OECD Working Paper, ECO/WKP(2013)41 (2013).
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Simultaneity of Product Quantities
▶ We use instrumental variables when estimating our outcome
Equation (12) to deal with the issue of simultaneity of qit and qjt.
▶ We instrument
∑n
j=1 aij,tqjt by the time-lagged total R&D stock
of all firms with an R&D collaboration with firm i, i.e.∑n
j=1 aij,txjt, and instrument
∑n
j=1 bijqjt by the time-lagged total




▶ To allow for potential correlation in unobservables across firms
(e.g. from unobserved R&D subsidies), the standard deviation of
the IV estimator is estimated by the spatial heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator.11
11Harry H. Kelejian and Ingmar R. Prucha. “HAC estimation in a spatial framework”.
Journal of Econometrics 140.1 (2007), pp. 131–154.
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Endogeneity of the R&D Stock
▶ To deal with the potential endogeneity of the time-lagged R&D
stock, we use supply side shocks from tax-induced changes to the
user cost of R&D to construct instrumental variables for R&D
expenditures as in Bloom et al. (2013).12
▶ Let wit denote the time-lagged R&D tax credit firm i received at
time t − 1.
▶ We then instrument q̄a,it by the time-lagged total R&D tax
credits of all firms with an R&D collaboration with firm i, i.e.∑n
j=1 aij,twjt, instrument q̄b,it by the time-lagged total R&D tax
credits of all firms that operate in the same industry as firm i, i.e.∑n
j=1 bijwjt, and instrument the time-lagged R&D stock xit by
the time-lagged R&D tax credit wit.
12Nicholas Bloom, Mark Schankerman, and John Van Reenen. “Identifying technology
spillovers and product market rivalry”. Econometrica 81.4 (2013), pp. 1347–1393.
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Endogenous Network Formation
▶ At is endogenous if there exists an unobservable factor that
affects both the output, qit and the R&D alliance, aij,t.
▶ If the unobservable factor is firm-specific, then it is captured by
the firm fixed-effect ηi.
▶ If the unobservable factor is time-specific, then it is captured by
the time fixed-effect κt.
▶ However, it may still be that there are some unobservable
firm-specific factors that do vary over time and that affect the
propensity of R&D collaborations and thus make the matrix
At = [aij,t] endogeneous.
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▶ We consider IVs based on the predicted R&D alliance matrix, i.e.
ÂtXt.
▶ We obtain the predicted link-formation probability âij,t from the
logistic regression of aij,t on:
▶ whether firms i and j collaborated before time t − s, where s is the
duration of an alliance,
▶ whether firms i and j shared a common collaborator before time
t − s,
▶ the time-lagged technological proximity13 of firms i and j
represented by Pij,t−s and P2ij,t−s,
▶ whether firms i and j are are in the same market, and
▶ whether firms i and j are located in the same city.
13Adam B. Jaffe. “Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R & D: Evidence from
Firms’ Patents, Profits, and Market Value”. The American Economic Review 76.5
(1986), pp. 984–1001; Nicholas Bloom, Mark Schankerman, and John Van Reenen.
“Identifying technology spillovers and product market rivalry”. Econometrica 81.4
(2013), pp. 1347–1393.
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We then use the following step-wise procedure to estimate our
model:14
▶ Step 1: Estimate a logistic link formation model. Use the
estimated model to predict links. Denote the predicted
adjacency matrix by Ât and its elements by âij,t.
▶ Step 2: Estimate the outcome Equation (12) using∑n
j=1 âij,txjt and
∑n




14Bryan S. Graham. “Methods of Identification in Social Networks”. Annual Review
of Economics 7.1 (2015), pp. 465–485.
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Estimation Results
Table: (Step 2) Parameter estimates from a panel
regression of Equation (12) with IVs based on time-lagged
tax credits. Model A includes only time fixed effects, while
Model B includes both firm and time fixed effects. The
dependent variable is output obtained from deflated sales.
The estimation is based on the observed alliances in the
years 1967–2006.
Model A Model B
φ -0.0133 (0.0114) 0.0128* (0.0069)
ρ 0.0182*** (0.0018) 0.0156** (0.0076)
β 0.0054*** (0.0004) 0.0023*** (0.0006)
# firms 1186 1186
# observations 16924 16924
Wald F 138.311 78.791
firm fixed effects no yes
time fixed effects yes yes
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.
** Statistically significant at 5% level.
* Statistically significant at 10% level.
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Table: (Step 1) Link formation regression results.
Technological similarity, fij, is measured using either
the Jaffe or the Mahalanobis patent similarity
measures. The dependent variable aij,t indicates if
an R&D alliance exists between firms i and j at time
t. The estimation is based on the observed alliances
in the years 1967–2006.
technological similarity Jaffe Mahalanobis
Past collaboration 0.5980*** 0.5922***
(0.0150) (0.0149)










# observations 3,964,120 3,964,120
McFadden’s R2 0.0812 0.0813
*** Statistically significant at 1% level.
** Statistically significant at 5% level.
* Statistically significant at 10% level.
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R&D Subsidies – Welfare Impact
Figure: (Left panel) The percentage increase in welfare due to a
homogeneous subsidy, s∗, over time. (Right panel) The percentage increase
in welfare due to (firm specific) targeted subsidies, s∗, over time.
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R&D Subsidies Rankings
Table: Subsidies ranking for the year 1990 for the first 25 firms.
Firm Share [%]a num pat. d vPF Betweennessb Closenessc q [%] hom. sub. [%]d tar. sub. [%]e SICf Rank
General Motors Corp. 9.2732 76644 88 0.1009 0.0007 0.0493 6.9866 0.0272 0.3027 3711 1
Exxon Corp. 7.7132 21954 22 0.0221 0.0000 0.0365 5.4062 0.0231 0.1731 2911 2
Ford Motor Co. 7.3456 20378 6 0.0003 0.0000 0.0153 3.7301 0.0184 0.0757 3711 3
AT&T Corp. 9.5360 5692 8 0.0024 0.0000 0.0202 3.2272 0.0156 0.0565 4813 4
Chevron 2.8221 12789 23 0.0226 0.0001 0.0369 2.5224 0.0098 0.0418 2911 5
Texaco 2.9896 9134 22 0.0214 0.0000 0.0365 2.4965 0.0095 0.0415 2911 6
Lockheed 42.3696 2 51 0.0891 0.0002 0.0443 1.5639 0.0035 0.0196 3760 7
Mobil Corp. 4.2265 3 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.9460 0.0111 0.0191 2911 8
TRW Inc. 5.3686 9438 43 0.0583 0.0002 0.0415 1.4509 0.0027 0.0176 3714 9
Altria Group 43.6382 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.4665 0.0073 0.0117 2111 10
Alcoa Inc. 11.4121 4546 36 0.0287 0.0002 0.0372 1.2136 0.0032 0.0114 3350 11
Shell Oil Co. 14.6777 9504 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.4244 0.0073 0.0109 1311 12
Chrysler Corp. 2.2414 3712 6 0.0017 0.0000 0.0218 1.3935 0.0075 0.0109 3711 13
Schlumberger Ltd. Inc. 25.9218 9 18 0.0437 0.0000 0.0370 1.1208 0.0029 0.0099 1389 14
Hewlett-Packard Co. 7.1106 6606 64 0.1128 0.0002 0.0417 1.1958 0.0047 0.0093 3570 15
Intel Corp. 9.3900 1132 67 0.1260 0.0003 0.0468 1.0152 0.0018 0.0089 3674 16
Hoechst Celanese Corp. 5.6401 516 38 0.0368 0.0002 0.0406 1.0047 0.0021 0.0085 2820 17
Motorola 14.1649 21454 70 0.1186 0.0004 0.0442 1.0274 0.0028 0.0080 3663 18
PPG Industries Inc. 13.3221 24904 20 0.0230 0.0000 0.0366 0.9588 0.0021 0.0077 2851 19
Himont Inc. 0.0000 59 28 0.0173 0.0001 0.0359 0.8827 0.0014 0.0072 2821 20
GTE Corp. 3.1301 4 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1696 0.0067 0.0070 4813 21
National Semiconductor Corp. 4.0752 1642 43 0.0943 0.0001 0.0440 0.8654 0.0012 0.0068 3674 22
Marathon Oil Corp. 7.9828 202 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1306 0.0060 0.0068 1311 23
Bellsouth Corp. 2.4438 3 14 0.0194 0.0000 0.0329 1.0926 0.0060 0.0064 4813 24
Nynex 2.3143 26 24 0.0272 0.0001 0.0340 0.9469 0.0049 0.0052 4813 25
a Market share in the primary 4-digit SIC sector in which the firm is operating. In case of missing data the closest year with sales data available has been
used.
b The normalized betweenness centrality is the fraction of all shortest paths in the network that contain a given node, divided by (n − 1)(n − 2), the
maximum number of such paths.
c The closeness centrality of node i is computed as 2n−1
∑n
j=1 2−ℓij(G), where ℓij(G) is the length of the shortest path between i and j in the network G
(Dangalchev, 2006), and the factor 2n−1 is the maximal centrality attained for the center of a star network.
d The homogeneous subsidy for each firm i is computed as e∗i s∗, relative to the average homogeneous subsidy 1n s∗
∑n
j=1 e∗j .
e The targeted subsidy for each firm i is computed as e∗i s∗i , relative to the average targeted subsidy 1n
∑n
j=1 e∗j s∗j .
f The primary 4-digit SIC code of a firm in the database.
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Table: Subsidies ranking for the year 2005 for the first 25 firms.
Firm Share [%]a num pat. d vPF Betweennessb Closenessc q [%] hom. sub. [%]d tar. sub. [%]e SICf Rank
General Motors Corp. 3.9590 90652 19 0.0067 0.0002 0.0193 4.1128 0.0174 0.2186 3711 1
Ford Motor Co. 3.6818 27452 7 0.0015 0.0000 0.0139 3.4842 0.0153 0.1531 3711 2
Exxon Corp. 4.0259 53215 6 0.0007 0.0001 0.0167 2.9690 0.0132 0.1108 2911 3
Microsoft Corp. 10.9732 10639 62 0.1814 0.0020 0.0386 1.6959 0.0057 0.0421 7372 4
Pfizer Inc. 3.6714 74253 65 0.0298 0.0034 0.0395 1.6796 0.0069 0.0351 2834 5
AT&T Corp. 0.0000 16284 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.5740 0.0073 0.0311 4813 6
Motorola 6.6605 70583 66 0.1598 0.0017 0.0356 1.3960 0.0053 0.0282 3663 7
Intel Corp. 5.0169 28513 72 0.2410 0.0011 0.0359 1.3323 0.0050 0.0249 3674 8
Chevron 2.2683 15049 10 0.0017 0.0001 0.0153 1.3295 0.0058 0.0243 2911 9
Hewlett-Packard Co. 14.3777 38597 7 0.0288 0.0000 0.0233 1.1999 0.0055 0.0183 3570 10
Altria Group 20.4890 5 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041 1.1753 0.0054 0.0178 2111 11
Johnson & Johnson Inc. 3.6095 31931 40 0.0130 0.0015 0.0346 1.1995 0.0051 0.0173 2834 12
Texaco 0.0000 10729 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0271 0.0055 0.0124 2911 13
Shell Oil Co. 0.0000 12436 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9294 0.0045 0.0108 1311 14
Chrysler Corp. 0.0000 5112 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9352 0.0052 0.0101 3711 15
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 1.3746 16 35 0.0052 0.0009 0.0326 0.8022 0.0034 0.0077 2834 16
Merck & Co. Inc. 1.5754 52036 36 0.0023 0.0007 0.0279 0.8252 0.0038 0.0077 2834 17
Marathon Oil Corp. 5.5960 229 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7817 0.0039 0.0076 1311 18
GTE Corp. 0.0000 5 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7751 0.0041 0.0073 4813 19
Pepsico 36.6491 991 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7154 0.0035 0.0066 2080 20
Bellsouth Corp. 0.9081 2129 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7233 0.0039 0.0063 4813 21
Johnson Controls Inc. 22.0636 304 11 0.0027 0.0001 0.0159 0.6084 0.0021 0.0063 2531 22
Dell 18.9098 80 2 0.0190 0.0000 0.0216 0.6586 0.0028 0.0061 3571 23
Eastman Kodak Co 5.5952 109714 17 0.0442 0.0001 0.0262 0.6171 0.0023 0.0060 3861 24
Lockheed 48.9385 9817 44 0.0434 0.0003 0.0223 0.6000 0.0028 0.0049 3760 25
a Market share in the primary 4-digit SIC sector in which the firm is operating. In case of missing data the closest year with sales data available has
been used.
b The normalized betweenness centrality is the fraction of all shortest paths in the network that contain a given node, divided by (n − 1)(n − 2), the
maximum number of such paths.
c The closeness centrality of node i is computed as 2n−1
∑n
j=1 2−ℓij(G), where ℓij(G) is the length of the shortest path between i and j in the network
G (Dangalchev, 2006), and the factor 2n−1 is the maximal centrality attained for the center of a star network.
d The homogeneous subsidy for each firm i is computed as e∗i s∗, relative to the average homogeneous subsidy 1n s∗
∑n
j=1 e∗j .
e The targeted subsidy for each firm i is computed as e∗i s∗i , relative to the average targeted subsidy 1n
∑n
j=1 e∗j s∗j .
f The primary 4-digit SIC code of a firm in the database.
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Figure: The transition matrix Tij from the rank i in year t to the rank j in
year t + 1 for the homogeneous subsidies ranking (left panel) and the
targeted subsidies ranking (right panel) for the first 100 ranks.
28/30
EUREKA Subsidized Firms
Table: Optimal subsidies ranking for the year 2005 including the first 10 firms which also received funding trough
EUREKA.
Firm hom. sub.[%]a tar. sub. [%]b EUREKA sub. [%]c SICd Country Ranke
Renault 1.4859 0.5354 0.0009 3711 FRA 238
TRW Inc. (ZF Friedrichshafen) 1.1668 0.4041 0.0114 3714 GER 273
Tandberg Data ASA 0.7445 0.3805 0.0019 3572 NOR 283
L’Oreal SA 1.2102 0.1314 0.0023 2844 FRA 405
Sydkraft AB 1.2817 0.1109 0.0004 4911 SWE 432
Carraro Spa. 0.9030 0.0923 0.0022 3714 ITA 458
SDL Inc. 1.0302 0.0144 0.0000 7371 GBR 624
York International Corp. 0.8501 0.0004 0.0001 3585 GBR 774
H Lundbeck A/S 0.8138 0.0000 0.0001 2834 DNK 1088
Riber SA 0.8444 0.0000 0.1728 3679 FRA 1252
a The homogeneous subsidy for each firm i is computed as e∗i s∗, relative to the total homogeneous subsidies∑n
j=1 e∗j s∗.
b The targeted subsidy for each firm i is computed as e∗i s∗i , relative to the total targeted subsidies
∑n
j=1 e∗j s∗j .
c The EUREKA subsidies comprise the total accumulated contribution to project costs (relative to the total funds
across all firms) in a given year, where all project costs involving a particular firm are considered. For more
detailed information see http://www.eurekanetwork.org/.
d The primary 4-digit SIC code according to Compustat U.S. and Global fundamentals databases.
e The rank corresponds to the ranking of 2005.
29/30
Summary
▶ We have developed a model where firms jointly form R&D
collaborations (networks) to lower their production costs while
competing on the product market.
▶ We have identified the positive externalities in the network
through technology spillovers and the negative externalities of
product rivalry from market competition.
▶ Using a panel of R&D alliances and annual reports, we have
tested our theoretical results and showed that the magnitude of
the technology spillover effect is much higher than that of the
product rivalry effect (i.e. net returns to R&D collaborations are
strictly positive).
▶ Finally, we identified the firms that should be subsidised the
most, and we have drawn some policy conclusions about optimal
R&D subsidies from the results obtained over different sectors, as
well as their temporal variation.
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